


20 August 1963

The Honorable Eugene G. Fubini
Deputy Director of Defense Research & Engineering
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Gene:

This responds to your memorandum of 8 July, Subject: JCS, NRO Relations, which forwarded for comment a draft proposed agreement between D/NRO and JCS-JRC prepared by Dr. McMillan and you as a shortened version of an agreement previously submitted to Mr. McCone by Mr. Gilpatric.

I have spent much time reviewing the new, shortened version of the proposed agreement, especially in the light of Mr. McCone's letter of 11 June to Mr. Gilpatric, and our subsequent conversations. While it is a shortened version of the agreement, it does not address itself to the major points of difference that Mr. McCone so clearly covered in his letter of 11 June. I would be less than frank with you if I did not state that I am still at a complete loss to understand just what the purpose of this proposed agreement is and just what benefits will derive from it, especially in the furtherance of a program for the collection of intelligence information.



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JCS and NRO review(s)
completed.

OSD, DIA review(s)
completed.

NASA Review Completed.

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I can see no valid reason for combining under a single entity the operational control of NRO denied territory overflights and DOD (JRC) peripheral mission flights. If this is desired with a view toward coordinating such activities, it appears unnecessary since there are already in existence procedures and well-defined understandings between the NRO (CIA operations element) and the JRC under which the JCS is kept fully aware of NRO overflight activities on a very current basis. If the problem here is one of higher-level policy, then the coordination is effected at the Special Group (5412) meetings and I would support a move on the part of the Department of Defense to have a JCS representative available at such meetings when denied area overflights are discussed.

I am sure you realize that existing relationships in the field of covert overflights between CIA operational elements, acting in behalf of the NRO, and the United States Air Forces are close and totally adequate. If the JRC, which is responsible for overt peripheral flights, were to be injected into this relationship, it would appear to me to complicate and encumber what are now quite workable methods for technical and operational coordination and technical and planning support for denied area overflights.

I agree that during periods of war, or at imminence of hostilities, or in theaters of active, military operations, or in periods of high tension, it would be appropriate for higher authority (and I would consider higher authority to be either a Presidential directive or mutual agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense) to authorize overt,

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military overflights of denied areas -- in such a case, this would be clearly a military responsibility and should be assumed by the JCS in areas so designated. In this connection, there is already an Emergency War Plans Operations Order to which CIA and SAC have agreed which facilitates such action. During the Cuban crisis such a transfer was effected smoothly and expeditiously, as you know.

The initial proposal for an NRO/JCS Agreement was generated sometime back in April and has been through a number of revisions at the working level as well as several at the policy level. We seem to be no closer to an agreement than we were at the beginning, and I think this is primarily because we do not have a meeting of the minds as to just what the purpose of the agreement is, i. e., what is it to accomplish that is not now being accomplished in a perfectly adequate and entirely satisfactory manner, what errors of omission or commission is it designed to correct, what transfer or realignment of responsibilities is it designed to effect, and basically what is being done that should not be done and what is not being done that should be done?

In the belief, then, that it may be desirable from the standpoint of the Department of Defense to have the NRO execute, supervise, guide, and control those specific, denied area overflights now being conducted by JRC -- i. e., BRASS KNOB [] missions -- and in accord with my expressed agreement that the NRO should be prepared to effect transfer to the military of certain overflights during periods of hostilities, I have attached a draft proposed agreement which I think will clearly put these two factors in proper perspective.

In the event it does not, I suggest that we get together around the table at your convenience to see what additional articles of what treaties need to be negotiated -- I am certain we all have only one mission in mind in this connection -- the most expeditious collection of usable intelligence information with the least disruption of command prerogatives and the most economical utilization of all of our combined resources.

Faithfully yours,

[]
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

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Attachment

NRO 25X1

D R A F T**AGREEMENT
D/NRO and JCS-JRC**

1. This agreement establishes arrangements for NRO supervision and control of aircraft reconnaissance flights over denied areas or other sensitive regions.
2. In order to ensure that technical and operational coordination is provided between JCS operated missions and NRO operated missions; that NRO and JCS are kept fully informed on all mission planning and mission status; that necessary logistic and operational support can be provided with adequate lead times, the D/NRO and the JCS agree that:
 - a. The Chief, JRC, will report to the D/NRO and will make the services of JRC available as the D/NRO directs, for the implementation of those aircraft reconnaissance operations conducted by the JRC over denied areas or over other sensitive regions.
 - b. The duties of the JRC will be in accordance with existing directives, understandings, and arrangements, amplified where necessary to reflect additional functions assigned to the JRC by the D/NRO in accordance with a., above.

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3. During periods of war or tension as determined by Higher Authority or as agreed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, and over such areas as may be designated by them at that time, airborne reconnaissance missions will become the responsibility of the JCS and necessary control and resources will be transferred from the NRO as required.

4. Except as specified above, nothing in this agreement alters existing arrangements for the conduct of NRO airborne reconnaissance missions and the technical and logistic support thereof by the JCS and the military services, nor does it alter the basic NRO agreement of 13 March 1963 between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense.

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12 JUL 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on Fubini's Proposal for a
DOD-NASA Agreement on NASA
Reconnaissance Programs

1. As I indicated to you orally, this agreement is a follow-up to the meeting I had with Seamans and Fubini on 3 July 1963. It is not necessarily a unique corollary to that meeting in that it decides a question by pre-emption which that meeting had referred to McCone, McNamara and Webb; namely, whether CIA or DOD should monitor NASA exploitations of reconnaissance contractors.

2. I believe that Fubini's proposal is completely consistent with the spirit of the NRO Agreement in that NRO is the joint CIA/DOD mechanism for dealing with reconnaissance programs. Insofar as DOD is the executive agent for NRO, the wording of the agreement is quite proper.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

7/10/63

MEMO FOR

Gene Kiefer

Gene, this draft agreement was reviewed with Bob Seamans (NASA) yesterday. He had a few comments which in my estimation do not require substantive changes from the draft you saw. This copy is identical to the one you saw yesterday, except for the added, ^{ink-bracketed} phrases which I put in from Seamans' comments.

The agreement will have to be signed by McNamara, Webb, and Mr. McGee. Accordingly, I think that it should be reviewed now by Mr. McGee, informally, so that an approved DoD-CIA wording can be discussed with NASA quite soon.

Could you deliver one to Mr. McGee and solicit his comments?



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9 JUL 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT: First NASA/DOD/CIA Meeting on Mutual
Programs for Reconnaissance**

1. The meeting was held at NASA Headquarters on 2 July 1963. NASA was represented by Dr. Robert Seamans and two of his Staff, DOD by Dr. Eugene Fubini of DDR&E, and CIA by the undersigned with [redacted] of DDR/OSA.

2. The topic of this meeting was narrower than originally expected and focused only on ways by which NASA could obtain lunar photography using cameras and/or contractors already working for DOD and CIA. It was agreed that the broader question of reconnaissance exploitation of regular NASA flights should be taken up in a smaller meeting after considerable homework had been done.

3. NASA has two programs under consideration for acquiring lunar photography as a direct and apparently essential support to the APOLLO manned lunar landing mission:

a. An unmanned lunar satellite launched in 1965 with an ATLAS-AGENA vehicle (200 lbs. in lunar orbit), sending back pictures by video link with a promised resolution of five to ten feet from an altitude of 60 km.

b. A manned reconnaissance of the moon using the actual APOLLO capsule fired into lunar orbit by the SATURN C-5 vehicle. The film would return from the moon with men after a complete APOLLO mission save only the landing.

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**SUBJECT: First NASA/DOD/CIA Meeting on Mutual Programs
for Reconnaissance**

4. Dr. Fubini has asked the Air Force to look at existing cameras to see if any could be carried to the moon by an ATLAS-AGENA, and expects an answer in three days. (I would be very surprised if a light camera and video link combination can be found to fit the payload constraint.) Dr. Seamans stated that NASA would contract independently for its development if no existing hardware is available for this program.

5. The APOLLO capsule presents no real weight problem for the manned lunar reconnaissance and the choices are large. However, it is unlikely that any existing camera would have the precise characteristics necessary for lunar photography, and it was agreed that we were discussing direct conversion of existing camera/film technology developed under DOD/CIA sponsorship. The NASA preference was for a split contract with an existing DOD/CIA payload contractor, with NASA sponsoring an unclassified project at the same firm directed toward their specific lunar mission.

6. Dr. Fubini suggested a meeting of McNamara, Webb and McCone on Tuesday, 9 July 1963, to settle whether CIA or DOD ought to oversee such a program so as to insure security on the black side.

7. My view is that CIA might do better at controlling a potentially dangerous split arrangement like this than DOD, but that it would be a thankless chore. On the other hand, if we intend to work with NASA in the future on exploiting their space opportunities, it might be a good way to get started and develop a working pattern for more important (to us) programs.

8. In the course of the meeting and afterward, Dr. Fubini offered the following interesting views:

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[REDACTED]

**SUBJECT: First NASA/DOD/CIA Meeting on Mutual Programs
for Reconnaissance**

a. He and the Air Force felt that NASA was completely incapable of controlling classified information, never mind protecting a black program.

b. He sees little if any potential in manned earth reconnaissance, but has allowed the Air Force to proceed with some modest planning for GEMINI. He doubts that man will be able to contribute to camera pointing and adjusting to the precision required by [REDACTED] but has directed the Air Force to perform some ground experiments on inertial tables to establish this potential. In any case, he feels that only 50% of the satellite malfunctions could have been corrected by a man, and that malfunctions of the life support system might have caused as many missions to be aborted to save the man.

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c. He is not so pessimistic about exploiting unmanned or piggyback orbital opportunities, except that we could not fund them from NRO in competition with the job we can now do with Air Force boosters. He suggested that the Webb offer is not one of "free rides" but rather a plea for budgetary support of their program.

d. Dr. Fubini pleaded with me to consider carefully the NASA offer, and is obviously opposed to its exploitation. This may be a result of the long and vigorous NASA/DOD battle (about which Gene spoke frankly). It may also spring from a genuine concern for the economic, security, and technical pitfalls of taking this gift horse home. In any case, his earnest recommendation adds up to an exclusive reliance on Air Force boosters for the NRO program, and I believe that we should continue to explore the NASA offer with a completely open mind.

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cc: DDCI
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